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ABSTRACT
This paper examines an ex-post rationale for the patenting of scientific discoveries. In this model,
scientist do not know which firms can make use of their discoveries, and firms do not know which
scientific discoveries might be useful to them. To bridge this gap, either or both sides need to engage
in costly search activities. Patents determine the appropriability of scientific discoveries, which
affects the scientists. and firms. willingness to engage in search. Patents decrease dissemination
when the search intensity of firms is sufficiently elastic, relative to that of scientists. The model also
examines the role of universities. Patents facilitate the delegation of search activities to the
universities’ technology transfer offices, which enables efficient specialization. Rather than
distracting scientists from doing research, patenting may be a complement to doing research.
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Over the last few decades, the number of patents ￿led by university scientists has in-
creased dramatically. In the US, an important driver for this has been the Bayh-Dole
act.1 Given the central role that science plays in the development of new technologies,
it is important to ask what e⁄ect the patenting of scienti￿c discoveries is likely to
have.
Standard economic theory emphasizes the incentive e⁄ects of patents. In order to
be willing to invest in research and development, it is necessary to have a guarantee
that the intellectual property generated by the investment is adequately protected
against appropriation. A large theoretical literature has closely studied this rationale
(Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001). The empirical evidence is sometimes inconclusive, but
provides at least some support for an incentive e⁄ect of patents (Arora, Ceccagnoli and
Cohen, 2003, Cohen et. al. 2002, Levin et. al., 1987). While the incentive rationale is
reasonably persuasive for private sector R&D, its applicability to academic research
is more questionable: scientists did research long before patents existed; scientists
are often intrinsically motivated (Murdock, 2002, Stern 2004) and concerned about
academic freedom (Aghion, Dewatripont and Stein, 2005); and scientists￿incentives
are strongly a⁄ected alternative incentive systems, such as tenure (Carmichael, 1988).
The e⁄ect of patents on scientists￿e⁄ort to engage in research are likely to be small.
If anything, the argument has been made that patenting can become a distraction
to scientists: they may divert research from basic to applied ￿elds, and they may
tempt scientists to pursue private pro￿ts opportunities, through start-ups or industry
collaborations (Shane (2004a), Thursby, Thursby and Mukherjee (2005)).
Apart from the ex-ante incentive argument, a small number of economists have
argued that patents also play an ex-post role. Kitch (1977) argues that patents en-
courage the dissemination of scienti￿c knowledge, after the discovery has already been
made. See also Denicol￿ and Franzoni (2004). One important aspect is that there
is a long path from scienti￿c discovery to marketable new product.2 The scienti￿c
discovery is only one of several inputs in a risky development process, that hopefully
leads to the eventual introduction a new product.
1See Henderson, Ja⁄ee and Trajtenberg (1998), Ja⁄ee (2000), Ja⁄ee and Lerner (2001), or Gallini
(2002).
2Our discussion here will focus mostly on product patents, although the argument is similar for
process patents.
1If scienti￿c discoveries are merely intermediate products, we have to distinguish
two distinct scenario. In one scenario the ￿nal product is not patentable, nor can
it be protected by other means, such as complementary assets or secrecy. In this
case it is easy to see that patents for scienti￿c discoveries are valuable. They solve
the appropriability problem at the input level, when it cannot be solved at the ￿nal
product level. Naturally, one has to ask why it is that only inputs but not outputs can
be patented. We focus on the other scenario where the ￿nal product can be patented,
or protected by other means. In this case, allowing patents for scienti￿c discoveries
allocates the intellectual property to the scientists, while allowing only patents on ￿nal
products allocates the intellectual property to the ￿rms that develop them. Under
the Coase theorem, di⁄erent allocations of intellectual property a⁄ect the distribution
of rents, but not the outcome or e¢ ciency of the development process. Naturally, the
Coase theorem assumes e¢ cient contracting. If all that is required is that a speci￿c
scientist and a speci￿c ￿rm agree on the terms of a development contract, then the
Coase theorem seems appropriate.
In this paper we identify a fundamental problem that prevents e¢ cient Coasian
contracting. Scientists often do not know what the potential uses of their scienti￿c
discoveries are, nor do they know what ￿rms may be potentially interested. Similarly,
￿rms are often unaware of what scienti￿c discoveries may be valuable for them. This
is what we call the gap between science and the market. The process of commer-
cialization has (at least) two important stages: there is the development stage, where
the scientist and the ￿rm need to combine their knowledge and assets to attempt
commercial development. At this stage, e¢ cient contracting may be possible. Prior
to the development stage, however, there is a search stage, where a match has to
be made between a scienti￿c discovery and a ￿rm that can potentially make use of
it. Elfenbein (2005) shows that considerable time and e⁄ort are required to identify
￿rms that are willing to license intellectual property from universities. At this search
stage, there cannot be e¢ cient contracting between the scientist and the ￿rm, simply
because they have not met yet. Hence the Coase theorem does not apply, and the
allocation of intellectual property rights matters. This is the starting point of our
analysis concerning an ex-post rationale for patenting scienti￿c discoveries.
A typical economic argument might go as follows. Consider a scientist who has
made a discovery that no one knows about. The scientist can invest some time and
money into promoting her discovery, searching for an appropriate ￿rm that can use
2it for the development of some new product. Without patent protection, when the
scientist discloses the discovery to the ￿rm, the ￿rm can appropriate the discovery.
This ruins the scientist￿ s incentives to seek out ￿rms in the ￿rst place. As a result,
the discovery remains unused. Patent protection can change this sad state of a⁄airs,
since it allows the scientist to collect a licensing fee for her discovery. Thus, patents
motivate scientists to promote their discoveries.
Though simple and elegant, this argument is also incomplete. It assumes a one-
sided matching process, where scientists seek out ￿rms to promote their scienti￿c
discoveries. Presumably these discoveries constitute technological ￿solutions.￿The
scientists￿challenge is to ￿nd a suitable ￿problem,￿i.e., a market need that can be
addressed with their scienti￿c discoveries. It might be more e¢ cient to have problems
seeking solutions, rather than solutions seeking problems. Consider the following
quote from an MIT engineer (Shane (2004b), p. 204):
With university technologies you pull the technology out and you run
around saying ￿ Where can it stick?￿It￿ s probably much better to say I￿ ve
heard about these problems and I think I can solve it. But with companies
coming out of MIT, it￿ s always the same thing, what do I do with it to
shoehorn it back into industry?
Naturally, ￿rms realize that they can do better than merely wait for scientists to
￿nd them. Indeed, there is a literature on ￿rm￿ s absorptive capabilities, that argues
that ￿rms invest in research capabilities, in order to ￿nd out what scienti￿c discoveries
might suit their needs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990).
In this paper we develop a formal theory of the search and matching process
between scientists and ￿rms. The model allows us to address the role of patents in
bridging the science to market gap. We do not rely on traditional incentive theories for
the generation of new ideas, and therefore take the arrival rate of scienti￿c discoveries
as given. We assume that most discoveries are irrelevant for most ￿rms, but that
occasionally there is a match between a scientist and a ￿rm. To ￿nd a match, ￿rms
and scientists invest in search. We use the term search in a broad sense. For a
scientist, this includes promoting her discoveries, and making them more accessible
to non-scientists. For a ￿rm, this includes investing in absorptive capabilities (e.g.
hiring managers who￿ s role it is to interact with academia), and communicating its
own technological needs. A match means that the ￿rm has complementary assets to
3pursue a development project that is based on the scientist￿ s discovery. If a match
occurs, the scientist continues to have a role in the development process. This is
because the scientist may have some tacit knowledge (or ￿know-how￿ ), that improves
the odds of success for the development process.
In the absence of patents, the ￿rm can appropriate most the value from the
discovery. The only source of bargaining power the scientist has comes from her
tacit knowledge. In equilibrium, the ￿rm appropriates the idea, but agrees to a
consulting contract, that rewards the scientist for her continued involvement with
the development process. With patents, the scientist has a much stronger bargaining
position. In equilibrium the ￿rm pays both for the license and the tacit knowledge.
In a one-sided search model, where scientists promote their ideas to ￿rms, but not
vice versa, we ￿nd that patents always increase scientists￿search incentives, and thus
reduce the expected time to ￿nd a match. This conclusion is easily reversed in a two-
sided search model, where patents promote scientists￿search, but discourage ￿rms￿
search. The net e⁄ect of patenting depends on the relative search e¢ ciencies of the
two parties. If the search intensity of scientists is inelastic, relative to that of ￿rms,
then patent protection actually decreases the likelihood that a scienti￿c discovery
gets developed.
This result adds to the literature on cumulative innovation. There is an im-
portant debate about the optimal allocation of intellectual property rights, when
second-generation inventors require the intellectual property of a ￿rst generation of
inventors. The work of Scotchmer (1991) and Green and Scotchmer (1995) shows
that, if ￿rst and second generation inventors can e¢ ciently contract with each other,
then an optimal patent system should provide strong intellectual property protection
to the ￿rst-generation inventors, to ensure e¢ cient ex-ante incentives. Merges and
Nelson (1990, 1994) question that conclusion by challenging the notion of e¢ cient
contracting between ￿rst and second generation inventors. This paper revisits the
issue of cumulative innovation from a search perspective. It provides a formal model
where there is a gap between ￿rst and second generation inventors. In such a model,
the allocation of intellectual property rights matters, not for the usual ex-ante in-
centive reason, but because they a⁄ect the intensities with which ￿rst and second
generation inventors are searching for each other.
So far, our discussion makes the simplifying assumption that only two parties are
involved, scientists and ￿rms. In reality, there is a third player that matters, namely
4the university. In most cases the university, not the scientist, owns the patent. The
university￿ s technology transfer o¢ ce can also assume the role of an intermediary
between scientists and ￿rms.
We augment our base model by introducing the university￿ s technology transfer
o¢ ce as a third player.3 The technology transfer o¢ ce has a lower cost of search,
because of specialization and/or because of a lower opportunity cost of time. We
assume that its objective function is to maximize the university￿ s returns. Any de-
velopment contract is negotiated between three parties. The interesting question is
whether or not the scientist wants to delegate the search activities to the technology
transfer o¢ ce. It turns out that this critically depends on whether the scientist and
the technology transfer o¢ ce can write complete contracts, at the beginning of the
search process. If such contracts are hard to write, then we obtain the interesting
result that with patent protection, the scientist gladly delegates all search activities
to the technology transfer o¢ ce. Without patent protection, however, the technology
transfer o¢ ce has no incentives to search for ￿rms. In this case the scientist prefers
to take responsibility of the search process herself. A complete contract prevents this
breakdown in delegation. However, writing a complete contract might be challeng-
ing, because, without a patent, it is di¢ cult to verify what constitutes a transfer of
intellectual property.
This result about delegation is reminiscent of the historic origins of the US patent
system. Lamoreaux and Sokolo⁄ (1999, 2001) show that the development of patents
in nineteenth century US was largely driven by the activities of patent intermediaries,
who specialized in the geographic dissemination of innovations. The result on dele-
gation also has implication for the debate whether patents encourage or discourage
basic research. After carefully controlling for selection e⁄ects, Azoulay, Ding and Stu-
art (2005) ￿nd that patenting increases research productivity. This paper provides
a novel interpretation for this result, one that does not depend on e⁄ort incentives.
Patents allow scientists to delegate the promotion of their scienti￿c discoveries to the
university￿ s technology transfer o¢ ce. This frees up their time to continue pursuing
their research. To the extent that the technology transfer o¢ ce succeeds in ￿nding
interested ￿rms, however, scientists may end up spending more time doing consulting.
3There are relatively few other theoretical models that explicitly examine the role of technology
transfer o¢ ces. See, however, Jensen and Thursby (2001), Chukumba and Jensen (2005) and Hoppe
and Ozdenoren (2005).
5Consistent with this, Azoulay, Ding and Stuart ￿nd that scientists who patent, are
subsequently more likely to coauthor with authors in industry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the base model. Section 3
derives the results for the one-side and two-sided search model. Section 4 introduces
the university￿ s technology transfer o¢ ce as a third party. Section 5 discusses a
variety of model extensions. It is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Base model
2.1 Base assumptions
All parties are risk-neutral. There is an in￿nite horizon, and we focus on steady state
equilibria. Let ￿ be the length of any one period. We focus on the continuous time
case, where ￿ ! 0. All parties use a discount rate r￿.
Suppose there is a number of scientists who all have a single scienti￿c discovery.
Each period, a discovery becomes obsolete with probability ￿￿. Each period, there
are s￿ new scientists arriving, each with a single new discovery. We assume that s
is exogenous. This assumption means that we are ignoring any incentive e⁄ects on
the scienti￿c discovery process itself. Section 5.1 return to this issue. On its own,
a scienti￿c discovery cannot generate commercial value.4 Such value can only be
created as part of a development project with a ￿rm that has complementary assets.
We assume that ￿rms are in￿nitely lived. For simplicity we assume that the number
of ￿rms is ￿xed. We relax this in section 5.1.
Consider the issue of ￿t between scienti￿c discoveries and ￿rms. Most discoveries
are irrelevant to most ￿rms. However, there are some matches between discoveries
and ￿rms that constitute development opportunities. If there is a match between
a scienti￿c discovery and a ￿rm, there is the additional question of what role the
scientist plays. We allow for the fact that the scientist has some tacit knowledge
that makes it worthwhile to involve her in the development process.5 Throughout
the paper we use the subscripts S and F respectively for scientists and ￿rms. The
4It is trivial to extend the model to allow the discovery to still have some value without the
development by another ￿rm. For example, the scientist might attempt to develop the discovery by
herself. All that matters for the model is that search and subsequent development by another ￿rm
is more e¢ cient.
5The work of Arora (1995, 1996) emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge, and shows how
patenting can further support the transfer of tacit knowledge.
6costs of development are given by dF and dS. Let p denoted the probability that
development generates a usable innovation of value of x. With probability 1 ￿ p,
nothing valuable comes out of development. We denote the expected return from
development by ￿ = px￿dF ￿dS. We assume that if one ￿rm invests in developing a
discovery, no other ￿rm wants to compete with it. Section 5.2. relax this assumption.
If the scientist refuses to be involved in the development process, the ￿rm may still
try to develop the discovery. Using obvious notation, we denote the expected return
from noncooperative development by ￿0 = p0x0 ￿ dF. We focus on the case where
the involvement of the scientist is e¢ cient, i.e., ￿ ￿ ￿0.6
Central to the analysis is the comparison between the regimes where the scienti￿c
discovery is versus is not protected by patents. For this we assume that the existence
of patents does not a⁄ect the value of x. We can think of the regime without patents
as a regime where there is no patent protection for scienti￿c discoveries, but there is
patent protection for the innovations that ￿rms create on the basis of scienti￿c discov-
eries. Alternatively, ￿rm innovations may be naturally protected by complementary
assets or other competitive advantages. Section 5.3 discuss this further. And section
5.6 examines an extension where patent protection is imperfect.
The game consists of two main stages. At the initial search stage (which is played
out in continuous time) scientists and ￿rms incur search costs. If a discovery becomes
obsolete, the game simply ends for that scientist. If there is a match between a
discovery and a ￿rm, the game progresses to the development stage. We denote the
utilities at the beginning of the development stage by uF and uS. The utilities at the
beginning of the search stage are denoted by UF and US.
When a ￿rm engages in development, the scientist receives a transfer ￿. At the
beginning of the development process, the respective utilities are given by uF = ￿￿￿
and uS = ￿. Below we derive the equilibrium value of ￿. ￿ includes the consulting
fees, and possibly a payment for the intellectual property. In this simple model, it
does not matter whether the transfer ￿ is unconditional (such as a licensing fee), or
conditional upon success (such as a royalty fee, pro￿t-share, or equity stake).7
6The analysis for ￿ < ￿0 is straightforward. If the scientist adds no value, the exact value of ￿ is
irrelevant, since it a⁄ect neither equilibrium outcomes nor outside options. The model with ￿ < ￿0
thus yields the same results as with ￿ = ￿0.
7To elaborate, let a be the unconditional and A the conditional transfer, then ￿ = a + pA. It
is easy to see that if the scientist￿ s development contribution is non-contractible, then incentive-
compatibility requires that pA ￿ dS ￿ p0A , A ￿
dS
p ￿ p0
.
7Central to the model is the matching process by which ￿rms and scientists ￿nd
each other. The probability that a given scientist ￿nds a matching ￿rm, is di⁄erent
from the hazard that a given ￿rm ￿nds a matching scientist, simply because there are
di⁄erent number of scientists and ￿rms. Let eS￿ be the probability that a speci￿c
scientist ￿nds a speci￿c ￿rm in any one period. And let eF￿ be the probability that
a speci￿c ￿rm ￿nds a speci￿c scientist in any one period. We assume that all these
probabilities are independent. Section 5.7 relaxes this assumption. For ￿ su¢ ciently
small, we can ignore all probabilities that multiple matches occur in the same period.8
The number of scientists and ￿rms is denoted by nS and nF. The probability that
a speci￿c scientist ￿nds some ￿rm with complementary assets is given by nFeS￿, and
the probability that she is found by some ￿rm with complementary assets is given by
nFeF￿. De￿ne
mS = nFe and mF = nSe where e = eF + eS, (1)
then the probability that a speci￿c scientist ￿nds a match in any one period is sim-
ply given by mS￿. Note that e represents the (instantaneous) probability that a
match occurs between a speci￿c scientist and ￿rm. Using analogous reasoning, the
probability that a speci￿c ￿rm ￿nds a match in any one period is simply given by
mF￿.
Finding a match requires costly search e⁄orts. The search intensities eS and eF
are private non-contractible choices. The per-period cost of search is given by ￿cS,
where we assume standard convex search costs: cS(eS) satis￿es c0
S > 0, c00
S > 0 and
cS(0) = 0; similar for cF(eF).
We denote the utility of a scientist in period t by US(t). This is given by
US(t) = mS(t)￿uS(t) + (1 ￿ mS(t)￿ ￿ ￿￿)
1
1 + r￿
US(t + ￿) ￿ cS(t)￿
In a steady state equilibrium we obtain after simple transformations
US =
1 + r￿
r + ￿ + mS
[mSuS ￿ cS]
For ￿ ! 0 we obtain
US =
mSuS ￿ cS
r + ￿ + mS
(2)
8These probabilities are all of the order ￿2 or higher, and naturally vanish for ￿ ! 0.
8The utility of a ￿rm is given by
UF(t) = mF(t)￿uF(t) +
1
1 + r￿
UF(t + ￿) ￿ cF(t)￿
In steady state, with ￿ ! 0, we get
UF =
mFuF ￿ cF
r
(3)
Note that US and UF have di⁄erent denominators. This is because they have di⁄erent
time horizons. Scientists have a single idea and then exit the market. In contrast,
￿rms participate in the market all the time, and develop all good ideas that they can
￿nd.
The number of scientists is obtained from nS(t+￿) = nS(t)(1￿￿￿￿mS￿)+s￿.
In steady state, we obtain nS = s
1 ￿ mS￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ + mS
. For ￿ ! 0, we obtain
nS =
s
￿ + mS
. (4)
The number of scientists searching for ￿rms is larger, if there are many new discoveries
(high s), little obsolescence (low ￿) and few successful matches (mS).
2.2 Bargaining game
We assume that all bilateral bargaining follows the Nash bargaining solution (Bin-
more, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986).
If a scientist does not have a patent, the ￿rst ￿rm with complementary assets
can appropriate the discovery and develop it by itself.9 The only source of bargaining
power for the scientist comes from her tacit knowledge, that can increase the expected
value of development. The Nash bargaining solution immediately implies
u
NP
F =
￿ + ￿0
2
and u
NP
S =
￿ ￿ ￿0
2
. (5)
The superscript NP refers to the no patenting regime. We use this superscript only
when there is a potential confusion with the other regime where there are patents,
9In this model we assume that the scientist discloses the information only after she can ascertain
that the ￿rm is a potential match. Hellmann and Perotti (2005) examine a model where an idea
generator cannot distinguish between partners that are complements or substitutes. In such a model,
an idea may circulate among several agents before an appropriate match is found.
9which we refer to with the superscript P.
Consider now the case where patent protection holds. Suppose a scientist has
disclosed the idea to a ￿rm with complementary assets. The ￿rm￿ s outside option
is simply to forgo the opportunity, which yields zero utility. The scientists outside
option is to search for another ￿rm. This e⁄ectively means starting all over again. It
therefore yields the same utility as next period￿ s ex-ante utility
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 + r￿
US.10 Using
￿ ! 0, we obtain the following Nash values
uF =
￿ ￿ US
2
and uS =
￿ + US
2
.
Note that ￿0 does not enter these expressions. This is because developing the dis-
covery without the scientist is no longer an option when the scientist controls the
intellectual property. Using US =
mSuS ￿ cS
r + ￿ + mS
we obtain after standard transforma-
tions
u
P
F =
￿(r + ￿) + cS
2(r + ￿) + mS
and u
P
S =
￿(r + ￿ + mS) ￿ cS
2(r + ￿) + mS
(6)
Intuitively, the higher the scientist￿ s search cost (cS), the weaker her bargaining power.
Moreover, the higher the discount rate (r) or obsolescence rate (￿), the weaker the
scientist￿ s bargaining power.11
3 Results from the base model
3.1 One-sided search
We ￿rst solve the one-sided model, where only scientists search for ￿rms. This model
assumes eF = 0. Every period the scientist maximizes US(t) by optimal choice of
10Strictly speaking, this assumes that the number of potential ￿rms nF is the same as before. To
justify this, we can think of the number of ￿rms being large, so that the di⁄erence between nF and
nF ￿1 is negligible. Alternatively, we can assume some loss of memory, where the scientist searches
again among all ￿rms, forgetting that she already matched with one of them in the past.
11We note that
duP
S
dr
￿
duP
S
d￿
￿ (2cS ￿mS￿) < 0. To see that this is negative, we simply note that
US =
mS
￿ + US
2
￿ cS
r + ￿ + mS
> 0 , mS
￿
2
￿ cS = US(r + ￿ +
mS
2
) > 0.
10eS(t). The ￿rst-order condition is given by
dmS(t)
deS
[uS(t) ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 + r￿
US(t + ￿)]￿ ￿ c
0
S(t)￿ = 0.
Using
dmS(t)
deS
= nF we obtain
nF[uS(t) ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 + r￿
US(t + ￿)] ￿ c
0
S(t) = 0.
The ￿rst term captures the marginal bene￿t while the second the marginal cost. The
marginal bene￿t naturally scales with the number of ￿rms nF. The most interesting
term is uS(t) ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 + r￿
US(t + ￿). This measures the di⁄erence in utilities between
￿nding a partner now, versus not ￿nding one now and continuing search.
For the steady state, using ￿ ! 0, we rewrite the ￿rst order condition as
nF(uS ￿ US) ￿ c
0
S = 0. (7)
Proposition 1 In the one-sided search model, the e⁄ect of patent protection is to
increase the scientists￿search intensity (eS).
The proof is in the appendix. The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward.
Patent protection increases the rents that scientists can capture from their scienti￿c
discoveries. This gives them a greater incentive to seek out ￿rms that may be able
to develop these scienti￿c discoveries. Indeed, without patent protection, the only
incentive that scientists have is to obtain a consulting contract. With a patent, they
are also looking at a return for their intellectual property.
In steady state, the likelihood of ￿nding a match is constant. This implies that
the time it takes to ￿nd a match (or become obsolete) has a negative exponential
distribution, with an expected waiting time of
1
￿ + mS
. This is decreasing in eS, which
implies that patenting reduces the expected waiting time. Patenting also reduces the
number of scientists actively searching, since nS is decreasing in eS (see equation (4)).
Another interesting aspect of the model concerns preferences over patent protec-
tion. Scientists always prefer to have patent protection. In most cases, ￿rms would
prefer that scientists have no patent protection, since this increases their value of
development from uP
F =
￿ ￿ US
2
to uNP
F =
￿ + ￿0
2
. However, there is a possibility
that ￿rms too prefer patent protection. This is because patent protection increases
11the number of matches.12
3.2 Two-sided search
The model with two-sided search is analogous to the one-sided model, except that
scientists and ￿rms make simultaneous search decisions. The ￿rm maximizes UF(t),
by choice of eF(t). The ￿rst order condition is given by
dmF(t)
deF
￿uF(t) ￿ c
0
F(t)￿ = 0.
For ￿ ! 0, using
dmF(t)
deF
= nS, we get
nSuF ￿ c
0
F = 0. (8)
Note that while scientists promote a single idea, ￿rms are always looking for many
ideas. That explains why their marginal incentive is not a⁄ected by concerns of
urgency. Indeed, the optimal choice of eF does not depend directly on r or ￿ (although
there may be an indirect e⁄ect through uF).
To determine the steady state equilibrium, we also need to consider the endoge-
nously determined number of scientist. That is, equations (4), (7) and (8) jointly
determine the equilibrium values of nS, eS and eF. We reduce this to a system
of two equations by using (4) in (8). Furthermore, from equation (2) we obtain
uS ￿ US =
(r + ￿)uS + cS
r + ￿ + nF(eS + eF)
. We can therefore rewrite the two equilibrium con-
ditions as
nF
(r + ￿)uS + cS
r + ￿ + nF(eS + eF)
￿ c
0
S = 0 and
suF
￿ + nF(eF + eS)
￿ c
0
F = 0. (9)
These two conditions describe the steady state reaction functions of scientists and
￿rms. The ￿rst term describes the marginal bene￿t of increasing search, the second
12For example, in the absence of patent protection, for ￿0 ! ￿ we get uS ! 0; equation (7)
implies eS ! 0, and thus UNP
F ! 0. Under these circumstances, the lack of patent protection leads
to a market failure, that hurts not only scientists, but also ￿rms. More generally, we note that the
utility frontier between ￿rms and agents is analogous to that of a standard principal-agent model. A
well-known result is that principals sometimes want to pay information rents (or ￿e¢ ciency wages￿ )
to agents, in order to move out of any backward-bending part of the utility frontier. The same
principle applies here.
12the marginal cost. We note that eS and eF are strategic substitutes: a higher value
of eF reduces the marginal bene￿t of increasing eS, and a higher value of eS reduces
the marginal bene￿t of increasing eF.13
The e⁄ect of patent protection is to increase uS and reduce uF. This increases
the scientists￿marginal bene￿t, whilst reducing the ￿rms￿marginal bene￿t. We thus
obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 In the two-sided search model, the e⁄ect of patent protection is to
increase the scientists￿search intensity (eS), but to decrease the ￿rms￿search intensity
(eF). The e⁄ect on the total search intensity (e = eF + eS) is ambiguous. If the
scientists￿search behavior is su¢ ciently inelastic (i.e., c00
S is su¢ ciently large), then
patent protection reduces e.
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 2 shows that in a two-sided model, the
net e⁄ect of patenting is ambiguous. On the one hand it encourages scientists￿search,
on the other it discourages ￿rms￿search. Whether or not patenting increases the total
probability of a match (e) - and thus decreases expected the waiting time (
1
mS
), as
well as the number of scientists actively searching (nS) - depends on the relative search
elasticities. If scientists respond relatively little to higher expected payo⁄s (relative
to the response of ￿rms), then patenting fails to increase dissemination, as measured
by the probability of ￿nding a match (e). The scientists￿response is inelastic if c00
S is
large, i.e., if marginal search costs are su¢ ciently steep.
For the one-sided model we noted that if scientists￿search incentives are impor-
tant, then it is possible that not only scientists, but ￿rms too, would prefer that
discoveries can be patented. A symmetrical argument applies if ￿rms￿search incen-
tives are important. In this case, it is possible that not only ￿rms, but scientists too,
would prefer that discoveries cannot be patented, because patenting may excessively
reduce the ￿rms￿search incentives.
13It is interesting to note that while the steady state reaction functions are substitutes, the instan-
taneous reaction functions are independent. To see this, we note from the instantaneous ￿rst-order
condition that the choice of eF(t) does not depend on eS(t). Similarly, eS(t) does not depend on
the contemporaneous value of eF(t), even though it does depend on all future values of eF(t + i￿)
(i = 1;2;:::) through US(t + ￿).
133.3 Welfare analysis
We brie￿ y examine the welfare properties of the model. From Proposition 2, it is
intuitive that the welfare impact of patenting is ambiguous in the two-sided search
model. Indeed, we immediately note that patenting increases US, but decreases UF,
so that patenting is never a Pareto improvement. In addition to a Pareto analysis,
we focus on the sum of utilities as a standard welfare criterion. However, we need to
be careful to include not only the utility of all current ￿rms (nFUF) and all current
scientists (nSUS), but also the discounted utility of all future generations of scien-
tists, which is given by
Pt=1
t=1 s￿
US
(1 + r￿)t. For ￿ ! 0 we obtain after standard
transformations
s
r
US. The social welfare function is thus given by
W = nFUF + nSUS +
s
r
US.
Using equations (2), (3) and (4) we obtain after further transformations
W =
nSnFe￿ ￿ nFcF ￿ nScS
r
Intuitively, social welfare is given by an in￿nite discounted stream of instantaneous
utilities, where the ￿rst term in the numerator is the instantaneous rate at which
matches occur in the market (nSnFe), times the value of a match (￿),14 and the
second and third term measure the total cost of search (nFcF and nScS). Note that,
for a given level of search intensities (eF and eS), the welfare function only depends
on the total value of a match ￿, but not on the distribution of that value (uF and
uS). This means that patenting a⁄ects welfare only through its e⁄ect on the search
intensities. We derive their socially optimal levels by maximizing W w.r.t. eS and
eF. The ￿rst order conditions are given by
nS[nF￿ ￿ c0
S] +
dnS
deS
(nFe￿ ￿ cS) = 0
nF[nS￿ ￿ c0
F] +
dnS
deF
(nFe￿ ￿ cS) = 0
14It is straightforward to augment the welfare function, adding ￿ to the value ￿, where ￿ is any
additional social utility that is generated when a match occurs. For example, a development project
may create some additional consumer surplus that is not captured in the pro￿ts ￿.
14The ￿rst term measures the net marginal bene￿t of increasing eS or eF, for a given
number of scientists nS. The second term adjusts this bene￿t to the fact that a higher
search intensity decreases the steady state number of scientists nS. Using (4) we can
rewrite these conditions as
nF
￿￿ + cS
￿ + nFe
￿ c
0
S = 0 and nS
￿￿ + cS
￿ + nFe
￿ c
0
F = 0. (10)
We compare these social optimality conditions with the equilibrium conditions from
equation (9). The scientist has an incentive to underinvest in search, because her
private bene￿t of ￿nding a match is given by uS, which is smaller than the social
value of a match ￿. This underinvestment problem is particularly severe in the ab-
sence of patents. Interestingly, comparing (9) with (10), we also note a countervailing
force, namely that a higher discount rate (r) creates urgency for the scientist, which
increases her search intensity eS, without a⁄ecting the socially optimal value in equa-
tion (10). For low values of r, there is underinvestment in the scientist￿ s search,
although for high values of r, there may be overinvestment.
For the ￿rm￿ s search, we also detect some ambiguity about under- versus overin-
vestment. Straightforward calculations reveal that ￿rms underinvest whenever uF <
￿￿ + cS
￿ + nFe
. This condition is more likely to be satis￿ed when there are patents, al-
though it may still be satis￿ed, even when there are no patents (such as when ￿ is
large).
In summary, the welfare conditions show that, depending on parameters, underin-
vestment and overinvestment may occurs, for scientists or for ￿rms. The net e⁄ect of
patenting is inherently ambiguous, since it can bring the equilibrium levels of search
either closer or further away from their socially optimal levels.
4 The role of the technology transfer o¢ ce
So far the analysis makes the simplifying assumption that scientists own the patents,
and that they search for ￿rms by themselves. We now consider a richer and more real-
istic set-up, where there is a third player, namely the university￿ s technology transfer
o¢ ce (TTO henceforth). In most cases, it is the university, not the scientist, that
owns the patent. Broadly speaking, this is true whenever the scienti￿c discoveries
were obtained making use of university resources. The role of the TTO is to adminis-
15ter the university￿ s patent portfolio, as well as to provide some intermediation services
for the transfer of technology. Concretely, the TTO performs a variety of tasks. It
often takes care of administrative steps, such as the ￿ling of patents. It negotiates
with the scientist. Even though the university owns the patent, the TTO may still
share the rewards with the scientist, especially if her participation is required at the
development stage. Moreover, the TTO may take over the process of identifying ￿rms
interested in developing the technology. That is, in many cases, it is not so much the
scientist as the TTO that engages in the search activities we have described so far.
The objective of this paper is not to model all the intricacies of how a TTO
operates, but, more speci￿cally, to examine how the presence of a TTO a⁄ects the
matching process between scienti￿c discoveries and ￿rms. To achieve this objective,
we have to make a number of modelling choices. It is likely that a TTO has a
comparative advantage at identifying potential partner ￿rms. This is because it can
hire managers who specialize in that task, and who do not have the competing time
pressures of pursuing scienti￿c research itself. We therefore assume that the TTO is
more e¢ cient at search. In section 5.5, we show how to relax this assumption. Using
obvious notation, the TTO has search costs cT(eT), again with cT(0) = 0, c0
T > 0 and
c00
T > 0. We also assume that eS and eT are duplicative, so that either the scientist
or the TTO would want to search, but not both.
One obvious advantage of having a TTO is that it probably makes it easier for
￿rms to ￿nd scienti￿c discoveries. That is, the presence of a centralized o¢ ce that
provides information on research activities facilitates ￿rms￿search. This is likely to
reduce cF.
In the neoclassical tradition of presuming sel￿sh economic behavior, we assume
that the TTO maximizes the returns of its owner, which is the university. Thus, the
TTO equates the university￿ s marginal bene￿ts of ￿nding a match with its marginal
cost of searching. It does not take into account any bene￿ts to the scientist, let alone
to potential partner ￿rms.15
At the time of negotiating the development contract, there are now three parties
15This assumption is somewhat stylized, in the sense that technology transfer o¢ ces, at the
minimum, pay lip service to the notion that they balance the interests of the university, the scientists,
and possible even industry. Using the assumption of sel￿sh behavior has the bene￿t of clarity.
Relaxing it also entails some technical di¢ culties, since it requires de￿ning a utility function over
other player￿ s utility functions, and then using this to solve the Shapley bargaining game.
Another interesting point to note is that even if the TTO behaves sel￿shly, the optimal contract
induces the TTO to internalize the scientist￿ s concerns, as shown below.
16at the bargaining table: the ￿rm who has the complementary asset, the scientist who
might have some valuable tacit knowledge, and the TTO who owns the patent (if
there is one). We assume that the three parties divide the returns according to the
Shapley solution (Hart and Mas-Collel, 1986).
Another modelling choice concerns the degree of contractual completeness. The
recent contracting literature has debated this with a lot of verve. In section 4.1 we
examine the incomplete, and in section 4.2. the complete contracting model. In
section 4.3., we explore more deeply the di⁄erences in the underlying assumptions,
and discuss their reasonableness in the speci￿c context of scientists contracting with
their TTO.
The time line of the model with incomplete contracts is as follows. The scientist
discloses a scienti￿c discovery to the TTO (we revisit this in section 5.4). A patent is
￿led at this point (provided there is patent protection). The TTO then searches for
a ￿rm with complementary assets. Once a match is found, the ￿rm, the TTO, and
the scientist bargain over access to the intellectual property, as well as a consulting
agreement. The timeline of the complete contract model is the same, except that the
scientist and TTO can write a contract at the beginning of the search stage. Since
the complete contracts model builds on the incomplete contracts model, we begin
with the latter.
4.1 Incomplete contracts
To solve the model, we ￿rst solve the bargaining game at the beginning of the devel-
opment stage. This is a three-person bargaining game between the ￿rm, the scientist,
and the TTO. To apply the Shapley value, we need to examine all possible sub-
coalitions.
Consider ￿rst the case with patent protection. The value of the grand coalition,
denoted by vFST, is the expected return from development, i.e., vFST = ￿. The value
of the sub-coalition involving the ￿rm and the scientist is vFS = 0, since they cannot
develop the discovery without access to the intellectual property. The value of the sub-
coalition involving the ￿rm and the TTO is given by vFT = ￿0, which is the expected
return when development occurs without the scientist￿ s involvement. The value of
the sub-coalition involving the scientist and the TTO is given by vST = UP
S + UP
T ,
where from (2), the respective ex-ante utilities are given by UP
S =
mP
TuP
S
r + ￿ + mP
T
and
17UP
T =
mP
TuP
T ￿ cP
T
r + ￿ + mP
T
. The idea is that if the ￿rm is excluded, the scientist and the
TTO simply have to start afresh and ￿nd a new partner. The value of the ￿rm alone
is vF = 0 and the value of the scientist alone is vS = 0, since neither party has the
intellectual property. Interestingly, the TTO alone can generate some value, since it
can try to ￿nd a new ￿rm, and then license out the technology without the scientist￿ s
cooperation. We use the subscript TnS to denote all outcomes that are associated
with the TTO acting alone, and write vT = UP
TnS.16
In general, the Shapley value is given by
uF =
1
3
(vSTF ￿ vST) +
1
6
(vSF ￿ vS) +
1
6
(vTF ￿ vT) +
1
3
vF
uS =
1
3
(vSTF ￿ vTF) +
1
6
(vSF ￿ vF) +
1
6
(vST ￿ vT) +
1
3
vS
uT =
1
3
(vSTF ￿ vSF) +
1
6
(vTF ￿ vF) +
1
6
(vST ￿ vS) +
1
3
vT
Applying this to the model with patents, we obtain
uP
F =
1
3
￿ ￿
1
3
(UP
S + UP
T ) +
1
6
￿0 ￿
1
6
UP
TnS
uP
S =
1
3
￿ ￿
1
3
￿0 +
1
6
(UP
S + UP
T ) ￿
1
6
UP
TnS
uP
T =
1
3
￿ +
1
6
￿0 +
1
6
(UP
S + UP
T ) +
1
3
UP
TnS
(11)
This describes the utilities for the development stage.17
To complete the model, we note that the equilibrium is again described by equa-
tions (4), (7) and (8) except that we use eT and cT, instead of eS and cS.
We can contrast this equilibrium with the equilibrium that obtains in the regime
without patents. Patenting a⁄ects the value of sub-coalitions, and has therefore
an important e⁄ect on relative bargaining power. The value of the grand coalition
16To calculate the value of UP
TnS, from (2), we have UP
TnS =
mP
TnSuP
TnS ￿ cP
TnS
r + ￿ + mP
TnS
, and, from (6), we
have uP
TnS =
￿0(r + ￿ + mP
TnS) ￿ cP
TnS
2(r + ￿) + mP
TnS
. Moreover, eTnS replaces eS in (7).
17Note that (UP
S + UP
T ) depends on uP
S and uP
T. It is tedious but straightfor-
ward to simultaneously solve the second and third equation, to obtain UP
S + UP
T =
(4￿ ￿ ￿0 + UP
TnS)mP
T ￿ 2
3r + 3￿ + 4mP
T
3r + 3￿ + 3mP
T
cP
T
6r + 6￿ + 4mP
T
. Replacing this in (11) provides an expression of the
solutions for uP
F, uP
S and uP
T.
18remains the same, i.e., vFST = ￿. The value of the sub-coalition involving the ￿rm
and the scientist is also given by vFS = ￿, since without patent rights, the TTO
cannot prevent development to occur. The value of the sub-coalition involving the
￿rm and the TTO is again given by vFT = ￿0. The value of the sub-coalition involving
the scientist and the TTO is now given by vST = 0, since the ￿rm can always develop
the discovery on its own. Indeed, that is why we also have vF = ￿0 and vS = vT = 0.
Using these coalition values, we obtain the following Shapley values for the model
without patents:
u
NP
F =
￿ + ￿0
2
, u
NP
S =
￿ ￿ ￿0
2
and u
NP
T = 0. (12)
We immediately note that the TTO obtains nothing, and that the ￿rm and the
scientist obtain the same bargaining shares as in (5). The reason for this is simple,
but profound: without patents, the TTO creates no additional value, after a match
has been made. This means that it wields no bargaining power, and hence obtains
no returns. Naturally, this a⁄ects its incentives at the search stage. From (7) we
immediately note that the optimal choice is simply eT = 0: without the prospects of
any rewards, the TTO is simply unwilling to invest in search.
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes with and without patents, we obtain the
following important result:
Proposition 3 With incomplete contracts, the e⁄ect of patenting is to enable dele-
gation of search activities to the TTO. Without patents, delegation is impossible.
4.2 Complete contracts
The previous section assumed a contractual incompleteness, where at the beginning of
the search stage, the scientist and the TTO do not write any contracts that govern the
search process. We now examine the case of complete contracts, where the scientist
and the TTO can write a contract that speci￿es rewards for successfully identifying a
development partner. Such a contract only involves the scientist and the TTO. There
always remains a more fundamental contractual incompleteness, namely that at the
search stage these two parties cannot write a contract with potential partner ￿rms,
simply because they don￿ t know who the relevant partner is.
Suppose now that it is possible to write a contract that speci￿es a transfer ￿1 from
the scientist to the TTO, in case of a successful match. In addition, let ￿0 denote any
19ex-ante transfer from the scientist to the TTO. For simplicity we assume no wealth
constraints, nor any other contractual limitations, so that ￿1 and ￿0 can take on any
positive or negative value. We denote the utilities in the complete contracts model
with a tilde, so that e uS = uS ￿ ￿1, e uT = uT + ￿1. Moreover, e US = US(￿1) ￿ ￿0 and
e UT = UT(￿1) + ￿0, where US(￿1) =
mTe uS
r + ￿ + mT
and UT(￿1) =
mTe uT ￿ cT
r + ￿ + mT
.
Proposition 4 With complete contracts, delegating search to the TTO is always op-
timal, with or without patenting. The optimal contract always allocates all the ben-
e￿ts from ￿nding a match to the TTO. We have ￿￿
1 = uS > 0, so that e uS = 0 and
e uT = uT + uS. Moreover, the optimal contract compensates the scientist through an
ex-ante transfer, i.e., ￿￿
0 < 0.
The proof is in the appendix. Proposition 4 establishes that, irrespective of the
patenting regime, a complete contract allows the scientist to always delegate search
activities to the TTO. The optimal contract speci￿es that the scientist transfer all her
utility from a match (uS) to the TTO. This utility includes not only any patenting
rights (there are none in the no patenting regime anyway), but also any surplus
that the scientist might obtain from her tacit knowledge. This means that the only
compensation that the scientist receives from a match is a small payment to cover
her development costs dS. Transferring all the utility from a match to the TTO is
e¢ cient, since the TTO becomes the residual claimant of the joint bene￿ts of ￿nding
a match. That means that the TTO has privately optimal incentives for search, since
it internalizes the scientist￿ s bene￿ts. Naturally, in order to give up the utility from
a match, the scientist receives an up-front compensation (￿0 < 0).
4.3 Discussion
In this section we discuss how reasonable complete contracts are in the speci￿c context
of our model. The most critical assumptions is that it is possible to make a transfer
￿1, that is contingent on ￿nding a true match. Consider ￿rst the case where there
are patents. The veri￿able event that triggers the transfer ￿1 is the licensing (or
sale) of the intellectual property rights to a ￿rm that wants to further develop the
scienti￿c discovery. It seems reasonable to suppose that the scientist and the TTO
can specify such a contingency in their initial agreement, given that licensing of a
speci￿c technology is a tightly de￿ned event. We contrast this with the case where
20there are no patents. In this case, there won￿ t be any licensing contract. The only
contract that is likely to occur is a consulting agreement between the scientist and
the ￿rm. Turning a consulting contract into the veri￿able event that triggers the
transfer payment ￿1, however, is much more problematic. Unlike with licensing, it
is much harder to ascertain whether a consulting agreement pertains to a speci￿c
discovery. Once the TTO has found a match, the scientist has an incentive to engage
in a consulting agreement with the ￿rm, but claim that this consulting agreement is
unrelated to the original discovery. This avoids paying the transfer payment ￿1. In
fact, it may even be possible for the scientist not to disclose to the university that
any consulting agreement has been signed, or to structure the consulting agreement
through a third party, such that it can no longer be traced to the speci￿c ￿rm.18
The interesting point is that the assumption of whether the scientist and the TTO
can reasonably write an ex-ante contract depends itself on the patenting regime. A
bene￿t of having patents is that it facilitates the writing of contracts, because the
licensing of a patent provides a veri￿able event itself. This suggests the conclusion
that if patents exist, delegation to the TTO is always possible. The patent facilitates
the writing of a complete contact, which allows the TTO to internalize the joint
bene￿ts of search. In this case, the model with the TTO essentially mirrors the
model of section 3, with search being performed by the TTO. However, if no patents
exists, then the scientist and the TTO might ￿nd it is di¢ cult to write complete
contracts. This may lead to a break-down of delegation. In this case, the model with
the TTO also mirrors the model of section 3, but with search being performed by the
scientist herself.
The discussion so far focusses on the di¢ culties with the contingent transfer ￿1.
There may be another set of problems with the unconditional transfer payment ￿0.
The optimal contract requires that the TTO pays the scientist for her discovery.
This can lead to an adverse selection problem, where every scientist in the university
suddenly ￿claims￿to have a discovery, that deserves to be compensated by the TTO.
To prevent adverse selection, the TTO compensates only those discoveries that prove
to have development potential. That means no ex-ante transfers to the scientist, i.e.,
18Purists may object that if intellectual property is veri￿able to a patent o¢ ce (or a patent court),
then it should also be veri￿able in private contracts (or a civil court). However, patenting has a
much more standardized process, suggesting lower costs of contracting. And patenting has well-
de￿ned rules and regulations, as well as a substantial amount of precedence, which creates better
enforceability.
21￿0 ￿ 0.19
If adverse selection prevents unconditional transfer payments to scientists, we have
a constrained contracting model. We brie￿ y outline the main insights from such a
model. It is easy to see that the optimal ￿0 satis￿es ￿0 = 0 (or equivalently ￿0 ! 0).
This is because the scientist sees no need or desire to compensate the TTO. If it
is impossible to contract on ￿1 (as discussed above), then there is no room for any
ex-ante contract, and the model reverts to the incomplete contract model. But even
if contracting on ￿1 is possible, the model easily reverts to the incomplete contract
model. To see this, note that the scientist can o⁄er some incentive compensation
(￿1 > 0) to the TTO, but she can never get the TTO to pay for it. For many
parameters, the scientist therefore simply refuses to make any contingent payments
to the TTO (￿1 = 0). In the appendix we derive the formal condition for when the
scientist sets ￿1 = 0 versus ￿1 > 0. We also show that even if ￿1 > 0, the optimal
incentives always fall short of the ￿rst-best level, i.e., ￿1 < ￿￿
1.
5 Model extensions
5.1 Endogenizing the number of ￿rms and discoveries
So far we assumed that the number of ￿rms (nF), and the number of new discoveries
(s) is exogenous (although the number of scientist that remain in the market (nS) is
endogenous). We now discuss how the model can be extended to allow both of these
to be determined endogenously.
To endogenize the number of ￿rms, suppose an investment is required to develop
some complementary assets, that allow a ￿rm to become a potential partner, i.e., to
become a member of the relevant set of ￿rms nF. Speci￿cally, suppose that ￿rms
have to incur some ￿xed cost k 2 [0;1), and that the distribution of ￿xed costs is
characterized by K(k). The entry condition is given by UF ￿ k, and the number of
￿rms is endogenously given by nF = K(UF).
The supply of patentable discoveries may also be endogenous. The literature
19It is straightforward to model this formally. Assume that there are two types of discoveries that
the TTO cannot distinguish ex-ante. One is truthful, as described in the main model. The other one
is fake, never generates any value, and never attracts any partner ￿rm. Suppose that the number of
potential fake discoveries is large. To induce self-selection, the TTO can o⁄er any ￿0 > 0 (including
￿0 ! 0), but it cannot o⁄er any ￿0 < 0.
22has identi￿ed two main reasons why the return to patents may a⁄ect incentives for
research. One hypothesis is that patents induce greater work e⁄ort. This corresponds
to the traditional ex-ante argument for patenting. As discussed in the introduction,
it is not clear that provision of e⁄ort is a major concern for scientists. A second, and
potentially more important incentive e⁄ect relates to a multi-tasking choice between
basic research, which is assumed to be unpatentable, and applied research, which
may potentially lead to a patent. For simplicity suppose that each scientist chooses
one of two career paths. The relative aptitudes and preferences for doing basic versus
applied research can be described by the following simply utility function: ￿S =
Max[a(US);b], where a(US) is the return to applied research, and b the expected
utility of doing basic research. Suppose that b has a distribution B(b) over [0;1). A
scientist pursues an applied research agenda whenever a(US) ￿ b. Let s(B) denote
the number of new applied discoveries that are generated if B scientists are dedicated
to applied research. Since s(B), B(a) and a(US) are all increasing functions, the
supply of new discoveries s is an increasing function of US. We write s(US), which is
a short-hand for s(B(a(US))).
Consider now the model where both the number of ￿rms and discoveries is en-
dogenous. We augment the equilibrium conditions with the additional equations
nF = K(UF) and s = s(US). We have already seen that the e⁄ect of patenting is to
increase uS, and to decrease uF. Moreover, patenting increases US and decreases UT.20
If the number of ￿rms and scientists is endogenous, patenting has some additional ef-
fects. A higher value of US increases the supply of applied researchers, increasing the
arrival rate of new discoveries. Similarly, a lower value of UF decreases the supply of
￿rms that are willing to invest in complementary assets. In addition to a⁄ecting the
(ex-post) search intensities, patenting thus a⁄ects the (ex-ante) investment decisions.
The e⁄ects are in line with the standard results from the ex-ante literature, in the
sense that patenting increases the supply of discoveries. In addition, our model also
shows that patenting can result in a decrease of ￿rms with complementary assets.
Again, we note that the net e⁄ect of patenting is inherently ambiguous.
20In section 3 we also discussed some minor exceptions to this, where the utility frontier is back-
ward bending. For brevity￿ s sake, we omit the discussion of this case.
235.2 Competitive development
The main model assumes that development is a natural monopoly. The ￿rst ￿rm to
be matched with the right scientist develops the discovery. No other ￿rm ￿nds it
worthwhile to attempt a competitive development e⁄ort. We now brie￿ y discuss how
to relax this assumption and allow for competition in development. Since the e⁄ects
of competition have been noted before in the large literature on patent races, we limit
the discussion to a highly stylized model, that quickly generates the main insights.
Suppose that instead of one, there may be up to two ￿rms that could develop
a scienti￿c discovery. We assume that the two ￿rms are symmetric, and that their
success probabilities p are independent of each other. With probability p2, both
development projects are successful, and the two ￿rms compete in a Bertrand fashion,
generating zero pro￿ts. With probability p(1 ￿ p) the ￿rst ￿rm is alone to develop
successfully. The expected pro￿ts under competition are thus given by ￿c = p(1 ￿
p)x￿dF ￿dS.21 With a patent, the scientist chooses to either license the intellectual
property to two competing ￿rms, or alternatively to give one ￿rm an exclusive license.
For the monopoly case, we denote the expected pro￿ts by ￿m = px ￿ dF ￿ dS.
To stay close to the structure of the main model, we assume that before a match
is found, the search process is the same as before. Moreover, once a ￿rm and scientist
are matched, and once they have agreed to cooperate on a development project, we
assume that it becomes easy to identify all other ￿rms that could initiate a competing
development project. We assume that there are many potential competitors for the
second development project, so that the scientist can extract all pro￿ts from the
second licensee.22 The condition for when the scientist wants to grant competitive
licenses is simply given by 2￿c > ￿m , dS + dF < (p ￿ 2p2)x. This requires that
development costs are not too high, so that their duplication is not too wasteful. The
model with competitive licenses is essentially the same as the model of section 3,
except that the value of a match is now given by ￿ = Max[￿m;2￿c].
The model with competition highlight two additional e⁄ects of patenting. Com-
petitive development is socially e¢ cient whenever (2p ￿ p2)x ￿ 2(dF + dS) > px ￿
21If the scientist withholds her tacit knowledge to one of the two ￿rms, then the two competitors
would have asymmetric pro￿ts ￿c+ = p(1￿p0)x￿dF ￿dS and ￿c￿ = p0(1￿p)x￿dF. For brevity￿ s
sake, we omit the discussion of this case.
22We continue to assume that the ￿rst ￿rm has some bargaining power. For example, the ￿rst
￿rm might know the identities of potential other licensees, but not disclose this information until it
has secured its own licensing agreement.
24(dF + dS) , (dF + dS) < (p ￿ p2)x. Without patents, there always is a second
￿rm that sets up competitive development. The ￿rst e⁄ect is that patenting can
sometimes prevent ine¢ cient cost duplication. This happens whenever (dF + dS) >
(p ￿ p2)x. In this case, patenting has the advantage of preventing socially wasteful
cost duplication. The second e⁄ect is that patenting can sometimes create ine¢ cient
monopolization. Speci￿cally, for (p ￿ 2p2)x < (dF + dS) < (p ￿ p2)x, the scientist
prefers exclusive licensing, even though competitive licensing is socially e¢ cient.
5.3 The protection of ￿nal product rents
So far, we used the assumption that if a ￿rm is the only one to successfully develop
a discovery, then it enjoys a pro￿t x, where x does not depend on the existence or
absence of a patent. We now brie￿ y discuss what happens when we relax this assump-
tion. The main issue that arises is rent dissipation. If it is possible for competing
￿rms to imitate the ￿nal product, then x can depend on patents. Let xP and xNP
be the pro￿ts with and without patents. If imitation is perfect, then, in the absence
of patenting, Bertrand competition generates xNP = 0. More generally, patents may
help to protect the returns from development, so that xP > xNP. A lower return to
development without patents, might a⁄ect the ￿rm￿ s willingness to incur development
costs in the ￿rst place. In particular, if xNP <
dF + dS
p
, then no ￿rm is ever willing
to develop a scienti￿c discovery without patent protection. In this case, patenting is
always e¢ cient, since without patenting, the development process collapses.
This line of reasoning was central for the passage of the Bayh-Dole act. While the
argument is economically plausible, our formal model helps to clarify the underlying
assumptions that are required for this result. It must be true that patents on scienti￿c
discoveries are e⁄ective in protecting the value of the ￿nal product. And it must be
true that, in the absence of these patents, ￿rms are unable to protect the value of
the ￿nal product. This set of assumptions may be valid under speci￿c circumstances
- e.g., the argument has some appeal for drug development - but it is not so clear
how broadly the argument applies in many other settings. Indeed, for the ￿ Bayh-Dole￿
rationale to hold, it must be that only the scienti￿c discovery is patentable, but not the
￿nal product. It is unclear why, in general, patenting of scienti￿c discoveries should
be easier than patenting of ￿nal products. If the ￿nal product is patentable, then
the simple ￿ Bayh-Dole￿reasoning does not apply, and we have to examine the more
25subtle trade-o⁄s that we derived in our main model. And even if it is impossible to
patent the ￿nal product, the simple ￿ Bayh-Dole￿rationale may still not apply, namely
when ￿rms can create other competitive advantages, such as assets, tacit knowledge,
or time to market, that allow them to protect the value of the ￿nal product.
The discussion of this and the previous section also helps to clarify some confu-
sion in the seminal work of Kitch (1977). Kitch seems to simultaneously argue that
patents help to overcome an overinvestment problem, where too many ￿rms would
invest in a discovery otherwise, and an underinvestment problem, where ￿rms would
be unwilling to invest otherwise. The underinvestment argument pertains to the
model with rent dissipation, where xNP <
dF + dS
p
. By contrast, the overinvestment
argument essentially assumes no rent dissipation (xNP = xP), but instead assumes
ine¢ cient cost duplication ((dF+dS) > (p￿p2)x). Our formal analysis hopes not only
to clarify Kitch￿ s confusion, but also to present a more balanced and comprehensive
framework, that allows us to examine the ex-post advantages and disadvantages of
patenting.
5.4 Voluntary disclosure
So far, in the model with the TTO, we assumed that the scientist is willing to disclose
her discovery to the university. Without patent protection, disclosure is irrelevant,
but with patent protection, disclosure is the ￿rst step towards a patent application.
Instead of disclosing her discovery, the scientist can search by herself for a partner
￿rm. The major drawback is that without disclosure, the scientist never wants to ￿le
a patent, since the university would simply lay a claim on it. The best the scientist
can expect without disclosure is thus to get a consulting contract.
To analyze the disclosure decision, consider ￿rst the case of incomplete contracts.
With disclosure the scientist￿ s utility is given by UP
S =
mTuP
S
r + ￿ + mT
where uP
S =
1
3
￿ ￿
1
3
￿0 +
1
6
(UP
S + UP
T ) ￿
1
6
UP
TnS. Without disclosure, using obvious notation, the
scientist obtains UNP
SnT =
mSnTuNP
SnT ￿ cSnT
r + ￿ + mSnT
where uNP
SnT =
￿ ￿ ￿0
2
. The scientist
bene￿ts from disclosure whenever
mTuP
S
r + ￿ + mT
>
mSnTuNP
SnT ￿ cSnT
r + ￿ + mSnT
. This condition is
easily satis￿ed, such as when the scientist has large search costs cSnT.
The most interesting issue is whether the condition can ever be violated, so that
26the scientist refused to disclose her discovery. To show that this is indeed possible, let
us focus on the case where tacit knowledge is important. Speci￿cally, we consider the
case where ￿0 ! 0. This implies UP
TnS ! 0, so that uP
S ￿uNP
SnT =
1
6
(UP
S +UP
T ￿￿) < 0
(since ￿ > uP
S + uP
T > UP
S + UP
T ). This says that for the scientist, disclosure has
a disadvantage in terms of a lower return from ￿nding a match. Naturally, one
advantage of disclosure is that it saves the scientist the cost of search (cSnT). To fully
assess the disclosure decision, we also need to know whether delegation to the TTO
results in a higher probability of ￿nding a match. The values mT and mSnT depend
both on marginal bene￿ts and costs. On the bene￿ts side, we note that for ￿0 ! 0,
we have uP
T ! uP
S < uNP
SnT. This says that the TTO has a lower bene￿t than the
scientist. If the TTO has a su¢ ciently large cost advantage over the scientist, we
may still obtain mT > mSnT . But for a su¢ ciently small cost advantages, we obtain
mT < mSnT. Suppose now that the scientist￿ s search costs are su¢ ciently small, and
su¢ ciently close to the TTO￿ s costs. In this case the advantages of disclosure are
small, but the disadvantage of disclosure remain large. We have thus constructed an
example where the scientist prefers not to disclose her discovery, in order to avoid
having to share returns with the TTO. Non-disclosure obviously negates any bene￿ts
of patenting, since the equilibrium reverts to the no patenting outcome.
In the model with complete contracts, disclosure becomes relatively more attrac-
tive to the scientist. This simply follows from the fact that at the initial bargaining
stage with the TTO, the scientist has, as her outside option, the utility of the in-
complete contracts model. In the negotiation she receives a utility higher than this
outside option. Hence disclosure becomes relatively more attractive.
So far we assumed that the scientist remains with the university. An additional
complication arises if the scientist can leave the university and pretend that the
discovery was made after leaving. The feasibility of this obviously depends on the
nature of the discovery, but the option of leaving can become an attractive alternative
to disclosure. This problem applies especially for graduate students. A curious and
unintended consequence of university patenting might be the departure of talented
researchers, who want to avoid disclosing their scienti￿c discoveries to the university￿ s
TTO.
275.5 Spin-o⁄s
The model of section 4 assumes that the TTO is more e¢ cient at search than the
scientist. This may be reasonable in many situations, but not all. We now brie￿ y
examine the case where the scientist is more e¢ cient. In this case, delegation to the
TTO is ine¢ cient. At the beginning of the search stage, the scientist and the TTO
can make a joint decision about the e¢ cient allocation of intellectual property rights.
It is immediate that the optimal outcome is for the TTO to transfer the intellectual
property rights back to the scientist. With control over her intellectual property
rights, the scientist has privately e¢ cient incentives to search for a potential partner
￿rm.
Licensing back to the scientist is e¢ cient whenever, using obvious notation, U
spin
S >
US+UT. In a spin-o⁄, the scientist always internalizes all bene￿ts from search. In the
case of complete contracting, the TTO also internalizes all bene￿ts from search. It
immediately follows that a spin-o⁄is e¢ cient whenever c0
S < c0
T. In the case of incom-
plete contracts, there is an additional ine¢ ciency with a TTO-led search, namely that
the TTO fails to internalize some of the bene￿ts from search. This means that even
if the scientist has slightly higher search costs, a spin-o⁄ may still be more e¢ cient
than a TTO-led search.
Our model can thus account for another common empirical phenomenon, namely
that a TTO sometimes licenses the intellectual property back to the scientist, who
then forms a spin-o⁄ company. Shane (2004b) provides a detailed analysis of such
university spin-o⁄s. An important insight from our analysis is that we need not
think of a spin-o⁄ as the creation of a company, that wants to develop the scienti￿c
discovery by itself. Instead, we can think of a spin-o⁄ as a mechanism for organizing
the search for a corporate partner, who will then undertakes the development, as part
of a strategic alliance with the spin-o⁄ company.
5.6 Imperfect patent protection
So far we assumed that either there is no patent protection, or patent protection is
perfect. We now consider the case of imperfect patent protection. For this, we use a
simple model of imperfect enforceability. We allow for e¢ cient pre-trial bargaining,
and we assume common priors. To model the uncertainty in the court system, let q
be the probability that a court upholds the patent. It is convenient to express the
28expected legal costs as a fraction of the value at stake x, i.e., suppose legal costs are
given by  Fx and  Sx, where  F; S 2 (0;1). If the patent is upheld, we assume
that the o⁄ender has to pay the patentee a licensing fee of ￿x, where ￿ 2 (0;1). If
the court revokes the patent, the alleged o⁄ender can proceed freely. Prior to going
to court, the two parties can settle. The expected utilities of going to court are given
by q￿x￿ Sx and x￿q￿x￿ Fx. Note that for q <
 S
￿
, the threat of going to court
is never credible, since the cost outweigh the expected bene￿ts. In this case the ￿rm
can simply ignore the patent, which is de facto not enforceable. For q >
1 ￿  F
￿
,
the ￿rm prefers not to infringe, rather than be dragged into court. In this case,
the ￿rm always agrees to obtain a license up-front. The patent is de facto perfectly
enforceable.
Consider now the intermediate case where
 S
￿
< q <
1 ￿  F
￿
. In this case, the two
parties would prefer to settle out of court. The gains from a pretrial settlement are the
legal cost savings ( F+ S)x. The Nash bargaining solution yields q￿x￿ Sx+
1
2
( F+
 S)x = (q￿+
 F ￿  S
2
)x and x￿q￿x￿ Fx+
1
2
( F + S)x = (1￿q￿￿
 F ￿  S
2
)x.
At the beginning of development stage, the two parties can sign a licensing agree-
ment. Strictly speaking, the ￿rm is indi⁄erent between striking a licensing agreement,
or waiting for a pre-trial bargaining. We focus on the more intuitive scenario, where
the ￿rm agrees to take a license up-front, but pays a reduced fee that re￿ ects imper-
fect enforceability. The transfer ￿ satis￿es uS = ￿ = px(q￿ +
 F ￿  S
2
) ￿ dF, which
is an increasing function of q. By varying q, the model with imperfect enforceability
spans the spectrum from no patent protection to perfect patent protection. Put dif-
ferently, for every ￿ 2 [0;uP
S], we can ￿nd a corresponding q that generates that value
of ￿. The model with imperfect patent protection therefore convexi￿es the discrete
distinction between the no patent and the perfect patent regime.
The analysis of imperfect patents has another interesting implication. From the
analysis in section 3, it is easy to see that the value of e = eF + eS is a concave
function of ￿. For su¢ ciently high values of c0
F (and/or su¢ ciently low values of c0
S),
e is increasing throughout the range ￿ 2 [0;uP
S], and for su¢ ciently low values of c0
F
(and/or su¢ ciently high values of c0
S), e is decreasing throughout the range ￿ 2 [0;uP
S].
But for intermediate values of c0
F and c0
S, e has an interior maximum with ￿ 2 [0;uP
S].
At low levels of patent protection (implying a low value of ￿), increasing patent
protection increases licensing rates. However, at high levels of patent protection
29(implying a high value of ￿), increasing patent protection decreases licensing rates.
Lerner (2002) provides evidence that suggests a similar inverse-U relationship between
patent protection and patenting rates.
5.7 Complementary search process
So far we assumed that the matching process consists of independent searches. We
brie￿ y consider an alternative model where it is impossible to ￿nd a ￿rm, unless it
makes an e⁄ort to be found - and similarly for a scientist. One can think of a variety
of model speci￿cation here, but we focus on a simple of model ￿double coincidence,￿
where a match can occur only if both parties make an e⁄ort. A simple example
would be if ￿rms and scientist have to rely on meeting each other in a common
location (such as a conference). The instantaneous probability of a match is now
given by e = eS ￿ eF. Straightforward calculations show that the steady state ￿rst
order conditions are given by
nFeF(uS ￿ US) ￿ c
0
S = 0 and nSeSuF ￿ c
0
F = 0.
Using similar reasoning as before, this can be rewritten as
nFeF
(r + ￿)uS + cS
r + ￿ + nFeSeF
￿ c
0
S = 0 and eS
suF
￿ + nFeFeS
￿ c
0
F = 0.
An interesting result is that the steady state reaction functions are no longer substi-
tutes, but complements.23 This implies there may be multiple equilibria.24 Indeed,
the above equations reveal that there always exists an equilibrium where eS = eF = 0.
That is, there always exists an equilibrium where the market collapses, because each
side of the market is waiting for the other to make itself visible. Scientists do not
invest in search, because ￿rms are impossible to ￿nd, and vice versa. In addition to
this coordination failure equilibrium, there may exist one or several equilibria where
23To see this, simply note that the scientists￿ marginal bene￿t can be rewritten as
nF
(r + ￿)uS + cS
r + ￿
eF
+ nFeS
, which is increasing in eF. Similarly, the ￿rms￿marginal bene￿t can be rewritten
as
suF
￿
eS
+ nFeF
, which is increasing in eS.
24Milgrom and Shannon (1994) provide a very general theorem of how complementarities in reac-
tion functions can generate multiple equilibria.
30both parties do invest in search (i.e., eS;eF > 0).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examine an ex-post rationale for the patenting of scienti￿c discoveries.
At the core of the model is the problem that scientists rarely know what industrial
applications may exist for their scienti￿c discoveries. At the same time ￿rms are often
unaware what scienti￿c discoveries might help them with their needs. We call this the
science to market gap. The gap can be bridged when scientists and ￿rms engage in a
process of search and communication. Since patenting a⁄ects the distribution of rents,
it has an e⁄ect on the relative search intensities of ￿rms and scientists. Patenting
scienti￿c discoveries bolsters the scienti￿c community to ￿push￿their discoveries out
to industry. However, it may also dampen ￿rms￿incentives to ￿pull￿discoveries out
of academia. The net e⁄ect of patenting depends on the relative ease of bridging the
science to market gap through ￿push￿or ￿pull.￿
The model also examines the importance of universities￿technology transfer of-
￿ces. In principle such o¢ ces allow for task specialization. Scientist bene￿t from dele-
gating search activities, which may free them up to pursue further research. However,
the model explains that such delegation typically requires patenting. This argument
generates a separate rationale for the patenting of scienti￿c discoveries.
As with any economic theory, our model has some restrictive assumptions, and
reality is always more complex. This leaves the door open for future research. For
instance, our analysis is focussed on the use of scienti￿c discoveries for developing
new industrial applications. It ignores the use of scienti￿c discoveries for subsequent
scienti￿c work. Murray and Stern (2005) provide evidence that patenting of scienti￿c
discoveries may have a negative impact on further scienti￿c progress. Future research
could examine the desirability of patenting when scienti￿c discoveries have multiple
uses.
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358 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let ￿S = uS￿US. The second order condition requires ￿nF
d￿S
deS
￿c00
S < 0. Using (2)
we get ￿S = uS￿
nFeSuS ￿ cS
r + ￿ + nFeS
. It is useful to also rewrite this as ￿S =
(r + ￿)uS + cS
r + ￿ + nFeS
,
so that
d￿S
deS
=
(r + ￿ + nFeS)c0
S ￿ ((r + ￿)uS + cS)nF
(r + ￿ + nFeS)2 . Using the ￿rst order condition
(7), we note that
d￿S
deS
=
nF[((r + ￿)uS + cS) ￿ ((r + ￿)uS + cS)]
(r + ￿ + nFeS)2 = 0. Thus convexity
of cS guarantees that the second order condition is always satis￿ed.
The e⁄ect of patenting is to increase uS. We have
d￿S
duS
= 1 ￿
nFeS
r + ￿ + nFeS
=
r + ￿
r + ￿ + nFeS
> 0, so that
deS
duS
=
￿1
c00
S
nF
d￿S
duS
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We use uS = ￿ and uF = ￿ ￿ ￿. We represent stronger intellectual property pro-
tection as an increase in ￿. We totally di⁄erentiate the two equations in (9) with re-
spect to ￿, and obtain
 
x11 x12
x21 x22
! 
deS
deF
!
+
 
y1
y2
!
d￿ = 0, where x11 = ￿c00
S <
0,25 x12 = ￿nF
nF(r￿ + ￿￿ + cS)
(r + ￿ + nFeF + nFeS)2 < 0, x21 = ￿nF
s(￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + nFeF + nFeS)2 < 0,
x22 = ￿
nFs(￿ ￿ ￿)
(￿ + nFeF + nFeS)2 ￿ c00
F < 0, y1 =
nF(r + ￿)
r + ￿ + nFeF + nFeS
> 0, and y2 =
￿
s
￿ + nFeF + nFeS
< 0. Thus
 
deS
deF
!
=
￿1
x11x22 ￿ x12x21
 
x22 ￿x12
￿x21 x11
! 
y1
y2
!
d￿.
The condition
￿1
x11x22 ￿ x12x21
< 0 ensures that the equilibrium is stable. Thus
deS
d￿
= ￿
x22y1 ￿ x12y2
x11x22 ￿ x12x21
> 0 and
deF
d￿
= ￿
x11y2 ￿ x21y1
x11x22 ￿ x12x21
< 0. In addition, note
that
d(eS + eF)
d￿
=
(x21 ￿ x22)y1 + (x12 ￿ x11)y2
x11x22 ￿ x12x21
. We note that this is increasing in
x11, and thus decreasing in c00
S. Hence, if scientists have su¢ ciently steep marginal
costs, then an increase in intellectual property rights increases eS by less than it
decreases eF.
Proof of Proposition 4:
25To see that x11 reduces to x11 = ￿c00
S, we totally di⁄erentiate the ￿rst equation w.r.t. eS and
obtain
nFc0
S(r + ￿ + nFeF + nFeS) ￿ nF(r￿ + ￿￿ + cS)nF
(r + ￿ + nFeF + nFeS)2 ￿ c00
S. We then use the ￿rst condition
again, which can be rewritten as c0
S(r + ￿ + nFeF + nFeS) = nF(r￿ + ￿￿ + cS). Thus x11 = ￿c00
S.
36The optimal ex-ante contract maximizes e US + e UT. For c0
S > c0
T, it is always more
e¢ cient that the TTO incurs the search costs. Straightforward calculations reveal
that the jointly optimal search e⁄ort is now given by the following variant of equation
(7): nF(uS+uT￿US(￿1)￿UT(￿1))￿c0
T = 0. Naturally, the TTO continues to optimize
privately, so that eT satis￿es nF(e uT ￿ UT(￿1)) ￿ c0
T = 0.26 The optimal ￿1 needs to
satisfy e uT ￿UT(￿1) = uS +uT ￿US(￿1)￿UT(￿1) , ￿1 = uS ￿US(￿1). This is always
satis￿ed for ￿￿
1 = uS, since ￿￿
1 = uS , e uS = 0 , US(￿￿
1) = 0.
To see that ￿0 < 0, we simply consider the ex-ante Nash bargaining game be-
tween the scientist and the TTO. In case of disagreement, we assume that the two
parties simply proceed without a contract. In this case, the model reverts back
to the incomplete contracts setting. Thus, e US =
US(￿￿
1) + UT(￿￿
1) + US ￿ UT
2
and
e UT =
US(￿￿
1) + UT(￿￿
1) ￿ US + UT
2
. Using e US = US(￿￿
1) ￿ ￿0 and US(￿￿
1) = 0, we
obtain ￿￿
0 = ￿
UT(￿￿
1) ￿ UT + US
2
< 0.
Analysis of the model with ￿0 ￿ 0
We brie￿ y sketch the model where the scientist can provide incentives to the TTO.
The scientist maximizes US(￿1) =
mT(uS ￿ ￿1)
r + ￿ + mT
, subject to the ￿rst-order condition
of eT(t), given by nF[uT(t) + ￿1 ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 + r￿
UT(￿1;t + ￿)] ￿ c0
T(t) = 0. We note that
dUS(￿1)
d￿1
=
(uS ￿ ￿1)(r + ￿)
(r + ￿ + mT)2
dmT
d￿1
￿
mT
r + ￿ + mT
, where the ￿rst term captures the ben-
e￿t of increasing incentives, and the second term captures the cost of providing incen-
tives. To evaluate the incentive e⁄ect we use UT(￿1) =
mT(uT + ￿1) ￿ cT
r + ￿ + mT
and totally
di⁄erentiate the ￿rst order condition. For ￿ ! 0 we have nF[1 ￿
mT
r + ￿ + mT
]d￿1 ￿
c00
TdeT(t) = 0 ,
deT
d￿1
=
nF
c00
T
(r + ￿)
r + ￿ + mT
. Using
dmT
d￿1
= nF
deT
d￿1
we ￿nally obtain
dUS
d￿1
=
(nF)2(r + ￿)2
(r + ￿ + mT)3
(uS ￿ ￿1)
c00
T
￿
mT
r + ￿ + mT
. The constrained optimal ￿1 is posi-
tive whenever
dUS
d￿1
> 0 at ￿1 = 0. We obtain three results. First, higher values of uS
increase
dUS
d￿1
, meaning that the scientist has a stronger desire to voluntarily provide
incentives. Second, higher values of c00
T decrease
dUS
d￿1
, showing that the scientist is
26Note that the ex-ante transfer ￿0 does not in￿ uence this equation, hence the use of UT(￿1),
rather than e UT(￿1).
37less interested in providing incentives when the TTO￿ s search behavior is inelastic.
Third, even if the scientist provides incentives, the constrained optimal ￿1 always lies
below the unconstrained optimal ￿￿
1 = uS. At ￿￿
1, the ￿rst term is zero, indicating
that the marginal bene￿t of providing bene￿t is zero, while the marginal cost remains
positive.
38